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Introduction
“The aim of science [is] to find satisfactory explanations, of 
whatever strikes us as being in need of explanation” [1].
Rationale
The recent lively discussion in phylogenetics about the concept 
of homology in relation to symplesiomorphies, synapomorphies 
and homoplasy represented an opportunity to address some latent 
issues left unresolved for a long time and allows formulation of new 
questions and new interesting reasoning peripheral to the main issue.
Platnick [2] recently questioned the interpretation by Nixon 
and Carpenter [3] according to which a symplesiomorphy must also 
be considered a homology, the symplesiomorphous parts are also 
homologues, and thus also a symplesiomorphy is evidence that must 
be explained. In opposing this interpretation, Platnick [2] gave the 
example of the phylogeny of spiders and of character absence/presence 
of spinneretsstating that: “What, then, is the plesiomorphic state of these 
characters? Presumably, the plesiomorphic state is merely the absence of 
these features. It is true that scorpions, opilionids, and other arachnids 
have those plesiomorphic states. Is the absence of spinnerets in scorpions 
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and opilionids a homology, and does it therefore require explanation? 
It is also true that birds, mammals, strawberries and bacteria do not 
have spinnerets. Do they therefore also share a homology that requires 
explanation? In short, is the absence of spinnerets in non-spiders evidence, 
and if so, evidence of what? It would seem that at most it could be 
construed as negative evidence-evidence that scorpions, opilionids, birds, 
mammals, strawberries and bacteria are not spiders. Does that evidence 
require explanation? My desk also lacks spinnerets; does my desk therefore 
share a homology with scorpions, etc., that ‘‘must be explained?’’. The 
passage quoted clearly highlights that the choice of the example “my 
desk” is a reductio ad absurdumor, as already mentioned by Brower and 
de Pinna [4], “an example of rhetorical hyperbole used to emphasize the 
absurdity of the alternative proposition”. Farris [5] properly criticizes such 
examples, bringing attention to the fact that the basis of the phylogenetic 
method is the explanatory importance of common ancestry. Then it 
follows that it is totally useless to refer to a ‘desk’ in the construction 
of the particular character (considering both the original concept of 
homology by Owen and the transformational one of Hennig there is no 
topographical, ontogenetic or positional evidence or correspondence 
to apply the same phylogenetic character to spiders as well as a desk). 
A comprehensive treatment and substantive resolution of the debate 
whether in a phylogenetic framework a symplesiomorphy must also be 
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memes and the process of co-evolution necessarily leads to a dramatic 
increase in brain size. An equally compelling logic is also applied to 
the onset of language [10].
In such a perspective, it is exactly the emergence of the second 
replicator that represents a genuine and real autapomorphy of 
the genus Homo, which allows them to consider the arrows of 
the Bushmen, a Shakespearean sonnet and the synchrotron in 
Grenoble as manifestations of a single and unique evolutionary 
process. Blackmore [10] stated that, although the transition from 
stone axes to fax machines was not absolutely inevitable, the 
degree of co-evolution between memes and genes achieved in 
Homo necessitated a shift  from stone axes to something more 
complex and highly improbable. Such a process is considered 
inevitable. As pointed out by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman [11] 
in addition to the vertical passage from father to son typical of 
genetic transmission, memetics as an evolutionary model of 
cultural information transfer can rely on the incredible power of 
the horizontal transmission such as between a child and another 
child, an adult and another adult, or between a child and an adult.
Once appeared, memes undergo a true evolution in the strict 
sense, being characterized by all the three conditions necessary to be 
considered as replicators [10]: 1) inheritance, with behavior copied 
in the general and in particular aspects; 2) variation, with possible 
errors, changes, additions and personal embellishments; 3) selection, 
i.e. not all behavior is emulated and copied with equal success. This 
form of inevitable cultural evolution, rooted in the initial phase to a 
strictly biological evolution (unique replicator) is the real reason for 
the so peculiar and sensational extended phenotype of humans.
Discussion
In this distinct perspective, Platnick’s desk, the Cadillac engine or the 
Saturn 5 rocket of the Apollo missions, represent -in all respects -part 
of the extended phenotype of Homo sapiens regarded as particularly 
evocative memes or memic complex (and therefore successful as 
replicators). With respect to the phylogenetic character in question and 
taking Hennig’s statement into account, the gain of the large and critical 
brain mass of humans through the co-evolution of genes and memes (and 
the resulting ability to plan, build and develop technology-from stone 
axes to nuclear submarines) results in a distinct autapomorphy of Homo, 
with the apomorphic state of these ‘ethological’ characters being reached 
at a precise node of the monophyletic tree of life. As such, it requires 
an explanation in the scientific field. Certainly to find a USB memory 
stick in Paleozoic deposits would sound dramatically odd, and we would 
try to find a possible explanation for the phenomenon. In the same way, 
potentially advanced civilizations in other solar systems, were a second 
replicator is independently occurred, probably would ask questions and 
attempt to seek an explanation in case of sighting of the probe Voyager 1 
launched in 1977 and currently well outside of the solar system.
However, logically we must not make the mistake of considering 
the rise of the different technologies or the various myths and 
legends (e.g., unicorns, witches, angels) as single unambiguous 
synapomorphies. In fact, many innovations such as the active 
production of food or the origin of writing have arisen multiple times 
in different forms and places and it is not said that all the populations 
of the world have now developed the idea of ‘angels’ or ‘unicorns’, 
supporting a polyphyletic rather than monophyletic origin. 
Nonetheless, the autapomorphy which lies at the base is the giant 
brain, the emergence of the second replicator and the co-evolution 
between memes and genes that inevitably leads to language, writing, 
and in the end to culture in a broad sense.
So, the American flag on the Moon as well as the Colosseum in 
Rome, are all evidence of an extreme ethological autapomorphy which 
identifies, in this case, the monophyletic clade Homo. In the purely 
hypothetical case of the arrival of an alien spaceship (and considering 
life monophyletic at the scale of planet Earth), the alien rocket and 
the Saturn 5 from the Mission Apollo would be clearly homoplastic 
considered as homology is outside the objectives of the present study. 
However, the use of anthropogenic objects or products of fantasy in such 
debates represents an opportunity to stress once again the truly holistic 
nature of the system conceived by Willi Hennig.
Rhetorical hyperboles of this kind, in fact, are not new in the 
literature on phylogeny and cladistics, considering that, in order to 
support a particular argument, a ‘Cadillac engine’ [6], ‘gold bars in a 
vault’, ‘unicorns’ and even ‘angels’ [4] have been recently mentioned. 
The question at this point is the following: do all these objects really 
represent absolute absurd reasoning in the phylogenetic field? Are we 
justified in ridiculing such objects in cladistics, within the framework 
of dialectical exchanges? The answer is absolutely not, and the reason, 
once again, can be found in the monumental and holistic approach to 
Phylogenetic Systematics by Hennig [7].
The semaphorontholomorphy and the extended phenotype
In introducing the fundamental concept of semaphorontholo-
morphy Hennig [7] stated: “The morphological characters of its spatial, 
three-dimensional body are not the only properties of a semaphoront. Rhat-
er these properties encompass the totality of its physiological, morpholog-
ical, and psychological (ethological) characters. We will call the totality of 
all these characters simply the total form (or the holomorphy) of the sema-
phoront, which thus is to be regarded as a multidimensional construct”. 
The ‘magic word’ in the context that concerns the present contribution is 
‘ethological characters’, to be connected to the concept of ‘extended phe-
notype’, as described and presented by Richard Dawkins [8], and to the 
concept of memes, as a second replicator beyond DNA in humans. The 
famous beaver dam and the resulting lake represent, according to that 
author, the extension of the phenotype of these animals (which is thus 
not limited for example to the skeletal structure of the beaver and other 
typical biological characters). The dam, as an external object generated 
by beavers, is directly related to evolutionary processes and differential 
reproductive and survival success: genes encode the construction of the 
dam-lake system, such a system ensures a subsequent differential repro-
ductive and survival success, the genes manage to duplicate themselves in 
future generations and so forth. What about the extended phenotype in 
the context of humans?
The giant brain and the emergence of a second replicator: 
memes
The modification of the outside world, both biotic and abiotic, 
through the extended phenotype reaches its unquestioned peak 
in a particular and unique kind of animal: humans. In his famous 
and fortunate ‘The Selfish Gene’, Richard Dawkins states: “Are 
there any good reasons for supposing our own species to be unique? 
I believe the answer is yes” [9]. What makes man so different from 
the rest of the animal world? The answer is ‘culture’ or better memes 
(defined “unit of cultural transmission” or “unit of imitation”): the 
unique emergence in man of a second replicator in addition to the 
DNA, capable of very fast evolution, a concept initially identified by 
Dawkins in 1976 and then discussed and treated at length by Susan 
Blackmore in her seminal work ‘The Meme Machine” [10]. According 
to Blackmore [10], what really makes the genus Homo unique is the 
ability for real imitation, which she suggests is closely linked to the 
evolution of an oversized brain. The size of the brain has achieved 
exceptional dimensions in a period that can be considered short 
geologically speaking (about two and a half million years, the period 
between modern humans and the last australopithecines). Blackmore 
[10] convincingly explains the process of co-evolution between 
memes (the second replicator) and the ‘big brain’: 1) the emergence 
of imitation by evolution leads to the onset of a second replicator that 
can spread much faster than the first (DNA); 2)the copied abilities 
initially proved useful from a biological standpoint, and the best 
imitators have experienced a reproductive advantage (“breed with 
the best imitator”); 3) at this stage the most successful memes start 
to ‘choose’ which are the genes that maximized their spread; 4) 
now the second replicator has taken over, the genes are triggered by 
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field of evolutionary biology could use these material objects, the 
result of the emergence of a second replicator, to communicate the 
extreme complexity and beauty of the phylogenetic system, rather 
than as a ridiculizing weapon in dialectical duels.
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in the ethological field (i.e. shared advanced technological status, not 
due to a common ancestry, but explainable by the separate origin 
and developments in different parts of the universe without previous 
cultural transmission between the two).
Obviously, with this contribution we donot support that “extreme” 
ethological characters of Homo should actually be used as characters 
in phylogenetic reconstructions. As mentioned above, myths, legends, 
technologies, or similar tools often emerged several times in the history 
of Homo, resulting in pervasive homoplasy, which would make them 
mostly inapplicable or misleading for cladistic purposes. In contrast, 
the goalof this text is simply to demonstrate that such elements can be 
explained in abiological and phylogenetical framework.
In fact, all this reasoning, which might merely seem to represent a 
‘word game’ or rhetorical exercise, indeed helps to see once again how 
the explanatory power of Hennig’s work is actually monumental, and 
how it can explain, in such an elegant way, the most disparate aspects 
of the phylogenetic history of life on Earth (Figure 1).
Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, going back to the original question as to whether 
even the ‘gold bars in a vault’, the ‘angels’ and ‘unicorns’ may have a 
phylogenetic explanation, and if they can be explained by common 
ancestry the answer is definitely yes. Even ‘unicorns’ found a 
phylogenetic and biological significance as extended phenotype: the 
emergence of fantasy objects, which do not exist in reality, products 
of the imagination of a massive brain generated by the co-evolution 
between memes and genes. It follows that also ‘angels’ and ‘unicorns’ 
are ethological evidences of a human autapomorphy: the emergence 
of the second replicator. The astonishing conclusion is that bacteria, 
whales, spiders, a desk, the Cadillac engine and a sonnet by 
Shakespeare or Dante Alighieri are in fact in some way monophyletic. 
However, one must keep in mind that the last three represent an 
extended phenotype of a particular clade (humans) and not organs to 
be related within the concept of homology.
Once the superb elegance of the system contemplated by 
Hennigis understood, wisdom (or simply common sense) forms the 
basis for not putting these different categories of life manifestations 
or evidence in the same ‘transformation series’, i.e. in the same 
character for phylogenetic analysis. Scholars and educators in the 
Humans Beavers Birds Spiders Termites
Figure 1: Oversimplified dendrogramshowing the necessary rooting of the different extended phenotypes within the monophyletic tree of life. From left to right: 
the Cadillac engine (original form: http://www.jalopyjournal.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/1952_Cadillac_331-OHV_V-8_art.jpg), the beaver dam (original 
from: http://i.imgur.com/DHgAMv0.jpg), bird nests (original from: http://static.fanpage.it/designfanpage/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Laura-Bacon-Dried-Plants-
Sculptures-4-638x425.jpg), spider's web (original from: http://www.vogliaditerra.com/photoblog/archives/2007/ragnatela.jpg) and termite mound (original from: 
http://static.panoramio.com/photos/large/7253008.jpg).
